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Abstract 
    The analysis provides a new explanation for two widespread prob-
lems concerning European unemployment policy: the disappoint-
ingly small effect of many past reform measures on unemployment, 
and the political difficulties in implementing more extensive reform 
programs. We argue that the heart of these problems may be the fail-
ure of many European governments to implement broad-based re-
form strategies. Our analysis suggests that major unemployment 
policies are characterised by economic complementarities (in the 
sense that the effectiveness of one policy depends on the implemen-
tation of other policies) and political complementarities (in that the 
ability to gain political consent for one policy depends on the accep-
tance of other policies). Under these circumstances, incremental, 
small-scale adjustments of existing policy packages are doomed to 
failure. Our analysis suggests instead that the European unemploy-
ment problem should be tackled through “broad” reforms that ex-
ploit the salient economic and political complementarities among 
individual policy measures.  
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Anatomy of Policy Complementarities 




Over the past 25 years, employment policy in many European countries has by and large failed 
to address the unemployment problem in an adequate way. Policy makers differ on why this has 
been so. Some contend that the problem is due to policy ineffectiveness, viz., it is alleged that 
the available policy instruments have little influence on unemployment. Others believe that un-
employment policies are pointless, since they merely replace the unemployment problem by an 
inequality problem. And yet others believe that the underlying problem is one of policy inactiv-
ity, viz., the policy initiatives have been too few and too timid. 
All these influential theses, we claim, are myths. We will argue, instead, that European un-
employment policies have frequently been unsuccessful because governments have generally 
failed to exploit economic and political complementarities among policy measures.  Economic 
complementarities exist when the effectiveness of one policy depends on the implementation of 
other policies, and  political complementarities arise when the ability to gain political consent for 
one policy depends on the implementation of other policies. 
This paper examines the causes and consequences of these complementarities, investigates 
the interplay among them, and analyses how unemployment policies are to be formulated in this 
context.  
Various contributions in the economic literature are relevant to these concerns. Coe and 
Snower (1997) identify various sources of economic complementarities.1 Some empirical evi-
dence of economic complementarities has emerged in a number of recent studies.2 There are 
some articles on why a particular political process may yield labour-market policies associated 
with excessive unemployment (e.g., Saint-Paul, 1993). Thus far, however, no attention has been 
given to how political policy complementarities arise alongside the economic ones, and what 
this network of complementarities implies for policy making. These important gaps are the sub-
ject of this paper. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses the three myths about unemployment 
policy making and how our analysis of complementarities debunks them. Section 2 constructs a 
simple framework for thinking about economic and political complementarities. Section 3 ex-
amines how to make policy decisions in the presence of these complementarities. And finally, 
Section 4 examines how political constraints on policy change can be overcome through broad-
based reform packages that take advantage of the existing economic and political complemen-
tarities among the individual policy measures. 
 
* We are deeply indebted to Lars Calmfors, Bertil Holmlund and Assar Lindbeck for comments. 
1 Coe and Snower (1997) examine economic complementarities in a static context. However, the dynamic aspect of the 
reforms turns out to be particularly significant for, as implied by the underlying model in Appendix B, the appropriate 
policy strategy can depend heavily on such dynamic factors as people’s rate of time discount and their degree of risk aver-
sion (or, equivalently in our model, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) regarding their consumption and work 
through time. Moreover, due to the existence of labour-turnover costs (such as costs of hiring, training, and firing), 
employed people generally have far greater chances of keeping their jobs than unemployed people have of acquiring 
them. Consequently, a policy that helps move people from unemployment into employment during one time period 
will influence the unemployment rate in subsequent time periods. This means that the long-term effects of compleme n-
tary policies may be substantially larger than their impact effects. This paper attempts to quantify these long-term effects 
for plausible economic parameters. 
2 See Buti et al. (1998), Daveri and Tabellini (1997), and Elmeskov et al. (1998). ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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1. The three myths 
Over the past two decades European unemployment policy has been conducted in the shadow 
of three powerful  –  although partially contradictory – myths. 
1.1. The policy ineffectiveness myth 
The policy ineffectiveness myth – that the available policy instruments are ineffective with re-
spect to unemployment – is an insidious one, since it diverts policy makers from focusing on 
measures to create employment and implies that their main objective should be to spread the 
burden of unemployment more equally across the working-age population, primarily through 
working time reductions and early retirement schemes. The dangers of this policy approach are 
well known.3 But beyond that, our analysis suggests that – despite the continued high levels of 
European unemployment in the face of numerous attempts at policy reform –  the available un-
employment policies may well not be inherently ineffective. The reason is that past reforms have 
often failed to exploit economic complementarities.  
It is easy to see how such complementarities may arise. For example, since it is impossible 
for people to find more work when firms do not provide new jobs, and since it is impossible for 
firms to fill their vacancies when there is no one looking for them, supply-side labour market 
policies (e.g., job search-promoting measures such as job counselling) are complementary with 
demand-side policies (e.g., measures to stimulate investment demand). Furthermore, tax breaks 
for hiring the long-term unemployed (such as those in France or Germany) may be ineffective in 
the presence of generous unemployment benefits, since the benefits will discourage the unem-
ployed from taking advantage of the tax breaks. Giving employers greater latitude in negotiating 
fixed-term contracts (as in Spain) may do little to stimulate employment unless the job security 
provisions associated with the incumbent employees are relaxed (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). 
Reducing the magnitude and duration of unemployment benefits may have only a limited effect 
on the employment rate in the presence of large incapacity benefits (as in the Netherlands) or 
high minimum wages (as in France).  
In the presence of economic complementarities, individual unemployment policy measures 
might look ineffective – but only when the overall package of policies is insufficiently “broad,” 
i.e. when the package covers an insufficiently wide range of policies within a set of economi-
cally complementary ones.  
1.2. The unemployment-inequality myth 
According to the unemployment-inequality myth, governments must choose between two dis-
agreeable options: a “flexible” labour market bedevilled by wide income disparities and an “in-
flexible” labour market crippled by unemployment. The “flexible” market, where people’s 
wages reflect their productivities, is allegedly achieved by reducing job security, restricting un-
employment benefits and welfare entitlements, eliminating minimum wages, and bashing the 
unions. The “inflexible” market, where people’s earnings reflect politicians’ judgements about 
fairness and social cohesion, is supposedly achieved by the opposite policies. The ultimate 
choice, then, is between unemployment and inequality. 
We argue that the unemployment-inequality trade-off should not be regarded as an exoge-
nous constraint on policy making. On the contrary, it is commonly the outcome of unenlightened 
policies. The system of unemployment benefits financed through general taxes is a good exam-
ple. When unemployed people find jobs, their unemployment benefits are withdrawn and taxes 
 
3 It has proved very difficult to implement worksharing and early retirement without raising non-wage labour costs (par-
ticularly costs of hiring and training) and thereby discouraging firms from creating more jobs. Furthermore, by dimin-
ishing the number of people competing for jobs, early retirement may put upward pressure on wages and thereby on 
prices. Monetary and fiscal authorities may then feel called upon to dampen inflation through contractionary policies, 
thus generating further unemployment. ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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are imposed on both them and their employers. Consequently, this policy discourages the un-
employed from seeking work and employers from providing it. Within this system, reducing un-
employment benefits would reduce unemployment, but only by making the unemployed worse 
off relative to the employed. What usually gets overlooked is that this unemployment-inequality 
trade-off is the outcome of the policy under consideration, which makes it impossible to compen-
sate the unemployed for a decline in benefits. As shown below, a “broader” set of complemen-
tary policies would permit such compensation. 
Our analysis suggests that by distributing the incentives to work more equally across the 
working population, it may be possible to reduce both unemployment and inequality. Economi-
cally complementary policies have an important role to play in shifting the unemployment-
inequality trade-off. “Narrow” packages of reforms – defined as packages that do not exploit 
the existing economic complementarities – are generally associated with unnecessarily unfa-
vourable trade-offs between unemployment and inequality. In contrast, “broader” packages 
could relax these disagreeable trade-offs. 
1.3. The inactivity myth 
Finally, the inactivity myth – that European governments have not done anything to reduce un-
employment – is false, since most European countries have been far from inactive on unem-
ployment policy over the 1980s and 1990s. The problem is that the employment policy strate-
gies have not, on the whole, focused on exploiting policy complementarities. But examples of 
policy activity abound. 
France, whose unemployment continues to hover around 12 percent, has implemented vari-
ous of measures to promote employment and stimulate job search, including reductions in em-
ployers’ social security contributions, subsidies for young workers and the long-term unem-
ployed, training programs and more flexible working-time arrangements. In addition, the French 
unemployment benefit system has been reformed to reduce the duration of unemployment 
benefits and to permit the size of the benefits to fall with their duration.  
Spain, with an unemployment rate that remains stubbornly above 20 percent, has undertaken 
an impressive variety of initiatives over the past one and a half decades. In 1984 it introduced 
fixed-term contracts with low statutory severance pay. In the early 1990s, the Spanish govern-
ment reduced the magnitude and duration of unemployment benefits and raised the minimum 
employment period that creates entitlement to benefits. Since then regulations limiting labour 
mobility have been dismantled, the monopoly of the state employment agency has been ended, 
and firms have been given opportunities to opt out of some aspects of sectoral wage agree-
ments. In addition, the government has introduced apprenticeship wage contracts associated 
with remuneration below the minimum wage and low non-wage labour costs.  
Italy, whose unemployment is still stuck at around 12 percent, has also conducted a long list 
of supply-side reforms over the 1990s. Wage indexation (the scala mobile) has been abolished, 
making wages more flexible in response to labour market pressures. Hiring regulations have 
been liberalised and job search programs have been instituted.  
Belgium, with an unemployment rate of 12.5 percent, has tightened unemployment insur-
ance eligibility requirements for the long-term unemployed, as well as for temporary and part-
time workers. Wage indexation has been watered down; tax exemptions have been granted for 
the hiring of young workers; and training programs for the long-term unemployed have been 
introduced.  
Despite this record, the inactivity myth is not entirely off the mark. Although most Euro-
pean countries have witnessed many reforms, these reforms have often been implemented in a 
partial, piecemeal, and timid fashion. Furthermore, European countries that have implemented 
labour market reforms (such as those discussed above) have often retained labour market 
measures that have tended to undercut these reforms. For instance, the French reforms above 
have probably been undercut by the maintenance of restrictive minimum wage legislation, and ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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the effectiveness of the Spanish reforms have probably been reduced through the maintenance 
of stringent job security legislation for incumbent employees in the primary sector of the econ-
omy (see, for example, Bentolila and Dolado (1994)). With two notable exceptions – the Neth-
erlands and the UK – policy changes have typically been introduced one at a time, each ration-
alised on a stand-alone basis rather than as part of a self-reinforcing package of complementary 
policies.  
If many existing labour market measures are economically undesirable – that is, if they are 
both inefficient and inequitable – why was not more comprehensive reform undertaken? This 
question is a political, rather than an economic one. What is it about the democratic political 
process that has kept many European governments from implementing bolder, more enlight-
ened reforms? 
To shed light on this important issue, we argue that unemployment policies are characterised 
by political complementarities. For example, as our analysis indicates, the political feasibility of un-
employment benefit reform (such as reducing the magnitude and duration of unemployment 
benefits) depends on tax reform (such as reducing payroll and income taxes) and employment 
promotion policies (such as hiring subsidies). The reason, we will argue, is that “single-handed 
reforms” (e.g., reducing unemployment benefits without changing any other policy instrument)  
– even though they may improve economic efficiency – often pit the interests of the employed 
against those of the unemployed, creating political deadlock. “Broad (many-handed) reforms,” 
by contrast, enable the government to use the efficiency gains from one reform to compensate 
the losers from another reform, and vice versa, thereby breaking the political deadlock.  
  In the presence of political complementarities, it is not surprising that if policy makers con-
sider a narrow portfolio of reforms, then governments will find it politically impossible to im-
plement bolder policy reforms. 
1.4. Debunking the myths 
In sum, the upshot of our analysis is that Europe’s cardinal policy mistake has been to focus on 
an excessively narrow set of policies, and implement these policies sequentially rather than in 
conjunction with one another. Labour market reforms have generally not be formulated con-
jointly to exploit a network of self-reinforcing economic and political complementarities.  
Economic complementarities reinforce the political ones, and vice versa. In particular, the 
greater are the economic complementarities, the greater is the payoff from broad reforms, and 
the greater is the government’s latitude to break political deadlock through such reforms. Con-
versely, the easier it is to break political deadlock through broad reforms, the more latitude the 
government has to exploit economic complementarities among the individual reform measures. 
The combination of economic and political complementarities makes a strong case for 
broad-based reform. In the presence of such complementarities, policy makers do not have a 
choice between “broad” reform (using many policy instruments in conjunction with one an-
other) and “deep” reform (using an individual policy instrument intensively). The reason is that 
deep reform is generally associated with unfavourable unemployment-inequality trade-offs, so 
that less unemployment can be achieved only by making some people significantly better off at 
the expense of making others significantly worse off. Such a c ourse often is politically unac-
ceptable. Thus, when there are significant policy complementarities, deficient breadth of reform 
may rule out sufficient depth.4  
We argue that the deficient “breadth” of much European labour market reform over the past 
two d ecades has made it politically infeasible to do more than small, incremental, piecemeal 
adjustments of prevailing policy packages. In this way, the deficient “breadth” of reform pack-
ages has been responsible for their deficient “depth,” as evidenced by the small changes in re-
 
4 But it is, of course, also true that when there is sufficient breadth, any increase in breadth often implies that is less need 
for each component of a labour-market policy package to be implemented as deeply as would otherwise have been nec-
essary. ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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placement ratios, duration of unemployment benefits, or severance pay requirements in many 
European countries. 
For labour market reform to become politically feasible, the u npleasant unemployment-
inequality trade-offs need to be relaxed, and that becomes achievable through “broad” reform. 
“Broad” reform strategies are not just more effective on account of economic complementari-
ties, but may also permit the implementation of “deep” reforms through the exploitation of po-
litical complementarities. 
2. A simple framework for thinking about policy 
complementarities 
In order to formulate strategies for broad-based policy reform, we need a framework for think-
ing about policy complementarities. To keep the framework simple and transparent, we strip 
labour market activity down to bare essentials.  
Consider a labour market in which workers are either employed or unemployed. Each em-
ployee has a chance f of becoming fired (and joining the unemployment pool), and each unem-
ployed person has a chance h of being hired (and joining the ranks of the employees). Moreover, 
the employed and unemployed workers retire at rate d, and new workers enter the labour force 
at the same overall rate, so that the aggregate labour supply remains constant through time. 
These transitions between employment and unemployment, and into and out of the labour 
force, may be illustrated as follows: 
 









Each employed worker receives an income that consists of the wage (w), paid by his em-
ployer, minus a tax on wage income, falling on the worker. Let t be the tax rate, so that the em-
ployee’s wage income is w(1 - t). Moreover, each unemployed worker receives an unemploy-
ment benefit (b).  










Employed workers  Unemployed workers 
f 
h 
New entrants to the 
labour force 
Retired workers 
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To fix ideas, our analysis of economic and political complementarities will focus on the in-
terrelations between the influences of two specific policies on unemployment: unemployment 
benefit reform (viz. reducing b) and tax reform (viz. reducing t). To begin with, let us examine 
how these policies affect the incentives of the employed and unemployed workers. 
2.1. Incentives to work and seek work 
Since economic complementarities among policy measures arise when these measures have 
complementary effects on people’s incentives, let us focus on employees’ incentives to work 
and unemployed people’s incentives to seek work. An employee’s work effort may be portrayed in 
terms of how he divides his time between work and leisure while on the job. In each period, the 
employee decides to spend an amount of time,  le, on leisure (where the subscript e stands for 
“employee”) and the remainder on work. 
Moreover, the less effort the employee devotes to his job (i.e. the more leisure le that the 
employee takes on the job), the greater are his chances of getting fired.5 So the employee faces 
an intertemporal trade-off. He enjoys leisure, but taking this leisure now raises his chances of 
losing his job in the future, thereby experiencing a drop in income. The greater the differential 
between the employee’s income and the unemployment benefit, the greater the cost of losing a 
job, and consequently the harder the employee will work (i.e., the less leisure he will take). 
Figure 2.  Influencing work effort 
 
 
Notes: The greater is wage income (w(1 - t)) relative to the unemployment benefit (b), the less leisure the employee takes 
on the job (and thus greater is the employee’s work effort). 
 
Along similar lines, an unemployed person’s effort in seeking work may be depicted in 
terms of how much time he spends looking for a job. In each period, the unemployed person 
spends a fraction of time, lu, on leisure (where the subscript u stands for “unemployed”) and the 
remainder on job search. 
The less effort the unemployed person devotes to job search (i.e., the more leisure lu the un-
employed person consumes), the lower are his chances of finding a job and thus the lower his 
chances of getting hired. This person also faces an intertemporal trade-off. The more leisure he 
takes, the better off he is now, but the worse off he will be in the future, for the smaller will be 
his chances of experiencing a rise in income. The greater the differential between the wage in-
come and the unemployment benefit, the greater the benefit of finding a job, and consequently 
the harder the unemployed worker will search. 
 
 
5 There are many possible reasons for this phenomenon. For example, the employer may find it worthwhile to promote 
work incentives by undertaking to fire an employee if his productivity falls beneath a specified minimum level. The em-
ployee’s productivity, furthermore, may depend on the amount of time he devotes to work, as well as on some random 
factors (accidents, diseases). Consequently, the more leisure the employee takes on the job, the lower his chance of ex-
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Note: The greater is wage income (w(1 - t)) relative to the unemployment benefit (b), the less leisure the unemployed 
worker takes (and thus greater is the unemployed person’s search effort). 
 
Thus unemployment benefit reform (reducing b) and tax reform (reducing t) stimulate the 
incentives to work and seek work, since they both widen the differential between the incomes 
received by employed and unemployed people. 
2.2. Incentives to hire and fire 
The firms make the employment decisions, viz. they determine the hiring rate (the chances that 
an unemployed worker is given a job) for any given level of search effort (lu) by the unem-
ployed. The firms also determine how the firing rate (the chances than an employed person 
loses a job) responds to work effort (le). These decisions are made so as to maximise profits. 
  Like the workers, the firms also face trade-offs. The greater the hiring rate, the greater are 
the firm’s hiring costs and, on the other hand, the greater is its revenue (from the output pro-
duced by the newly hired employees). With regard to firing, firms face explicit firing costs as 
well as effort-related costs: the greater is the firing rate, the smaller is the gain from work effort 
(since the job is likely to be terminated sooner), and thus the smaller will be employees’ work 
effort. The firm also has benefits from firing: the more responsive is the firing rate to work ef-
fort, the greater will be the work incentive. 
  The firms seek to achieve the hire and fire rates that maximise their profits, subject to the 
trade-offs above. 
2.3. Sources of economic complementarities 
In this context, it is easy to see how economic complementarities can arise. The following are 
two major sources. 
  First, the most basic complementarity between unemployment benefits and taxes arises be-
cause  the firms’ search for workers reinforces the workers’ search for jobs, and vice versa. It is no use to 
give the unemployed incentives to seek jobs (say, by reducing their unemployment benefits) if 
firms lack the incentives to hire them (say, because wages, after tax, are too high). Conversely, 
it is no use to give the firms incentives to create new jobs if workers lack the incentives to seek 
them. In this way, unemployment benefit reform (promoting search for jobs) is complementary 
to tax reform (promoting search for employees). 
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Figure 4.  Economic complementarities operating through the interaction between the 














Here the economic complementarities may be identified through the following causal relations: 
•  Unemployment benefit reform (a fall in  b) raises the workers’ reward to job search, which 
stimulates the amount of search the workers do. This, in turn, increases the reward from hir-
ing, for the harder the workers search for jobs, the cheaper it is for employers to hire them. 
Thereby unemployment benefit reform gives more leverage to the influence of tax reform (a 
fall in t) on the reward to hiring (viz, tax reform stimulates hiring). 
•  Furthermore, tax reform raises the reward to hiring, which stimulates the employers’ search 
for workers. This, in turn, raises the reward to job search, for the harder employers search for 
workers, the more likely will workers’ search be successful. Thereby tax reform increases the 
effectiveness with which unemployment benefit reform stimulates the reward from job 
search. 
 
Second, a complementarity between unemployment benefit reform and tax reform arises be-
cause employees’ work effort reinforces employers’ retention decisions, and vice versa. There is little point to 
give employees incentives to work hard (say, by reducing unemployment benefits) if firms have 
no intention of retaining them; and on the other side, there is little point to give firms incentives 
to retain their employees if these employees lack the incentives to work.  
The relevant causal relations are illustrated in the following figure: 
Unemployment 
benefit reform:  
b  ﬂ 
Tax reform:     
t  ﬂ 
 
 
Reward to job 
search:   › 
 
Reward to hir-
ing:   › 
Search for 
jobs:   › 
Search for work-
ers:   › 
Unemployment   ﬂ 
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Unemployment   ﬂ 
 
Figure 5.  Economic complementarities operating through the interaction between 













Now the economic complementarities work themselves out through the following channels: 
•  Unemployment benefit reform raises the workers’ reward to work effort, which stimulates 
the employees’ work effort. This, in turn, raises the firms’ reward from retention, for the 
harder the employees work, the more worthwhile it is for the firms to retain these employees. 
Thereby unemployment benefit reform increases the effectiveness of tax reform in stimulat-
ing the firms’ reward from retention. 
•  Moreover, tax reform increases the reward to employee retention, and thereby raises the 
length of employees’ job tenure. This, in turn,  stimulates the reward to working, for the 
longer employees can expect to remain employed, the larger is their reward for their work ef-
fort. In this way tax reform increases the leverage of unemployment benefit reform in stimu-
lating the reward for work effort. 
 
These are particularly significant, but by no means the only, complementarities operative in 
our model. Further examples of complementarities are given in Appendix A.6  
2.4. Assessing economic complementarities 
The total degree of the economic complementarities between unemployment benefit reform and 
tax reform may be measured by a statistic called the “cross elasticity of unemployment with re-
spect to unemployment benefits and taxes”. This measure indicates how much the responsive-
ness of unemployment to the unemployment benefit is influenced by the tax (or equivalently, by 
 
6 It is worth noting that, although unemployment benefits are not taxed in our model, the complementarities described 
here occur regardless of whether such taxes are levied.  
Unemployment 
benefit reform:  
b  ﬂ 
Tax reform:     
t  ﬂ 
 
 
Reward to working:   
› 
 
Reward to employee 
retention:   › 
Work effort:   
› 
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how much the responsiveness of unemployment to the tax is influenced by the unemployment 
benefit.)7 
The following table provides computations of these cross elasticities for various levels of 
unemployment benefits and tax rates. These computations are based on plausible parameter 
values for our model, built on the analytical framework described above (and specified in Ap-
pendix B). 
 
Table 2. The effects of alternative tax-benefit policy  
combinations 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The first row of the table describes the baseline position of our model economy. The welfare 
effects of alternative tax-benefit policy combinations are evaluated relative to this baseline. In 
the first column, b is given in terms of the replacement ratio (the ratio of unemployment bene-
fits to the wage). The second column gives the tax rate t. The fourth and fifth columns specify 
the elasticity of unemployment with respect to the replacement ratio (hb) and the elasticity of 
unemployment with respect to the tax rate (ht). The cross-elasticities are given in the third col-
umn.  
These economic complementarities are brought into sharp relief in Figure 6, which plots the 
cross-elasticities corresponding to a wide range of tax and benefit values. 
Figure 6. Economic complementarities 
 
[Insert figure on “Economic Complementarities” here] 
 
  The previous table and figure convey a strong message. First, all the cross elasticities are 
positive, which means that the unemployment reducing effect of benefit reform (a fall in b) is 
always augmented through tax reform (a fall in t). Second, the cross elasticities rise as the un-
employment benefit and the tax rate rise. This means that the higher the unemployment benefit 
and the tax rate, the more benefit reform and tax reform reinforce one another with respect to 
unemployment. In short, the gains from exploiting the economic complementarities are greatest 
when taxes and transfers are highest.  
Intuitively, when unemployment benefits and taxes are high, the resulting deficient reward to 
job search reinforces the resulting deficient reward to hiring. Since the deficiencies are large, the 
reinforcement effects are large as well. Under these circumstances, the economic complemen-
tarity from reducing unemployment benefits and taxes are particularly significant.  
Another reason why the cross elasticities are high when unemployment benefits and taxes 
are high is that high benefits and taxes give rise to deficient rewards to working and deficient 
rewards to employee retention. Once again, these deficiencies reinforce one another, and thus 
the economic complementarity from unemployment benefit and tax reductions are large when 
benefits and taxes are high initially. 
The upshot of these economic complementarities is illustrated in the following figure, which 
shows how the unemployment rate depends on the unemployment benefit and the tax.  
 
7 Specifically, the responsiveness of unemployment to the unemployment benefit is computed as the percentage change 
in the unemployment rate resulting from a percentage change in the unemployment benefit. Then the cross elasticity is 
the percentage change in the above responsiveness resulting from a percentage change in the tax. ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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Figure 7. Unemployment, taxes, and transfers 
 
[Insert figure on “Unemployment, Taxes, and Transfers” here] 
 
Observe that the unemployment rate not only rises with the benefit and the tax; it rises particu-
larly fast when the benefit and the tax are increased together. 
3. Policy decision making in the presence of  
complementarities 
The existence of economic complementarities indicates that there may be a payoff to setting 
different policy instruments conjointly, but it offers little guidance on how to do so. The reason 
is that we have said nothing so far about whether the government is able to finance the com-
plementary policies above (for instance, not all the policies in Table 1 leave the government’s 
budget in balance). Furthermore, we have not considered whether the policies are politically 
feasible. (For example, only one of the policies in Table 1 make both the employed and unem-
ployed people better off, and thus political consensus in favour of the other policies may be dif-
ficult to achieve). In order to understand how different policy measures can be used in conjunc-
tion with one another to achieve a socially desirable unemployment rate, it is necessary to take 
account of the budgetary and political constraints that governments face. This section provides 
a simple framework of thought for these issues. 
We do so in a sequence of steps. First, we examine the government budget constraint, which 
describes what combinations of benefits and taxes the government can afford. Second, we de-
scribe the status quo of the labour market, i.e. the initial position that the government seeks to 
improve. Third, we specify the aim of government policy, i.e., its objective in terms of unem-
ployment and inequality. And fourth, we show why this aim may be impossible to achieve on 
account of political constraints. In Section 4 we then examine how political deadlock can be 
overcome by broadening the portfolio of policy measures. 
The scenario8 we examine in this section may be termed the “Franco-German nightmare” 
(where France and Germany are perhaps the most prominent, but by no means the only, Euro-
pean countries to have exhibited these economic symptoms): unemployment is undesirably 
high, as are unemployment benefits and taxes, but the government finds it politically infeasible 
to do anything about this problem. 
 
8 This scenario is generated by the plausible parameter estimates described in Appendix B. Of course, different estimates 
are able to generate different scenarios (as defined by the relative shapes and positions of the government budget con-
straint and the indifference curves of the employed and unemployed people, described below). We have decided to con-
centrate on the scenario above since it appears to typify an important problem of policy decision making in Europe. ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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  3.1. The government budget constraint 
To capture the government’s budgetary restrictions in a transparent way, let us suppose that the 
money spent on unemployment benefits must be raised through taxes. The following figure de-
picts the government budget constraint  (GBC) in the context of the labour market described 
above. 









Clearly, when the government makes no transfers, it needs to raise no taxes: so when the un-
employment benefit b = 0, then the tax rate t  = 0 as well. Thus the government budget con-
straint goes through the origin of the figure.  
If the ratio of unemployed people to employed people were constant, a rise in the unem-
ployment benefit would need to be financed by a proportionate rise in the tax rate.  But as the 
unemployment benefit rises, the number of unemployed people rises relative to the number of 
employed ones.  Consequently, equal incremental increases in the unemployment benefit b re-
quire larger and larger incremental increases in the tax rate t. This phenomenon is amplified by 
the fact that the increases in the unemployment benefit and tax rate also raise unemployment 
and reduce employment (by reducing the reward to work), further raising transfer payment and 
further eroding the tax base.9 Consequently, the government budget constraint in the figure be-
comes progressively flatter as the unemployment benefit b rises.  
Eventually, the unemployment benefit reaches a maximum, bmax in the figure. Beyond that, 
further increases in the tax rate (t) reduce the tax base (N) by so much that tax revenues (tN) 
can no longer fund transfers at the rate of bmax per head. Thus, the unemployment benefit de-
clines. This is the well-known “Laffer effect,” pictured by the downward-sloping portion of the 
government budget constraint in the figure.  
Another useful way of viewing the government budget constraint is in terms of its implica-
tions for unemployment benefit reform and tax reform. Along the upward-sloping portion of the 
government budget constraint, unemployment benefit reform reinforces tax reform and vice 
versa: a drop in unemployment benefits permits the government to finance a drop in taxes, and 
vice versa. As result, unemployment falls, which enables the government to drop unemploy-
ment benefits and taxes even more; and so on. These successive declines in unemployment 
benefits and taxes may be called the “government budget multiplier.”  
 
9 Naturally, an increase in the unemployment benefit b may also lead to an increase in the wage w. This effect increases the 
tax base, enabling the government to keep the tax rate lower than it would otherwise have been. In our parameteriza-
tion of the model in Appendix B, this effect is dominated by the influences outlined in the text above. 
GBC 
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The larger are the economic complementarities between the two policies, the more will a given 
reduction in unemployment benefits and taxes reduce unemployment, and consequently the lar-
ger will the government budget multiplier be. 
3.2. The status quo of the labour market 
The status quo position of the labour market may be represented by a point on the government 
budget constraint, such as point I in the following figure (where I stands for “initial” position).  









The welfare of the unemployed people at the status quo point may be illustrated by the indif-
ference curve ICu, going through point I. This indifference curve is the set of points along which 
the unemployed people are equally well off.10 Observe that this indifference curve is upward-
sloping: An increase in the unemployment benefit  b makes the unemployed people better off 
and an increase in the tax rate t makes them worse off (since it reduces their income once they 
become employed). Thus a rise in the unemployment benefit must be offset by a rise in t so 
that the unemployed remain equally well off along the indifference curve. 
The welfare of the employed people at point I may be illustrated by the indifference curve 
ICe, going through point I. This indifference curve, which is the set of points along which the 
 
10 For visual ease, this indifference curve (as well as the one for employed people) is drawn as a straight line, although it 
is not entirely straight in the numerical model of Appendix B.  
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employed people are equally well off, is also upward sloping. A rise in the tax rate t makes the 
employed people worse off (since it reduces their income), while a rise in the unemployment 
benefit b makes them better off (since it increases their purchasing power when they become 
unemployed). Thus a rise in the benefit must be counteracted by a rise in the tax in order for the 
employed people to remain equally well off along the indifference curve. 
The indifference curve of the employed people is steeper than that of the unemployed. The 
reason is that the well-being of the unemployed is more sensitive to unemployment benefits 
(which they receive now) than to taxes (which they would have to pay only once they find jobs 
in the future). By the same token, the well-being of the employed is more sensitive to taxes 
(which they pay now) than to unemployment benefits (which they would receive only if they 
become unemployed in the future). 
The level of unemployment at point I is depicted by the iso-unemployment curve UI, de-
scribing the set of points along which unemployment is the same as at point I. 11  Observe that 
since a rise in the unemployment benefit b raises unemployment, a fall in the tax rate t is re-
quired to keep unemployment constant. Thus the iso-unemployment curve is downward slop-
ing. The closer an iso-unemployment curve lies to the origin (where b = t = 0), the lower the 
level of unemployment (for the lower is the unemployment benefit and tax rate).  
We now ask whether, starting from the status quo point I, the government can improve peo-
ple’s welfare through unemployment benefit and tax reform.  
3.3. Policy decisions and the political process  
Given that the wage, work effort, and job search are outside the government’s direct control, 
what position could the labour market achieve if the political process worked perfectly, that is, 
if the political process would permit the government to set its policy instruments so as to 
maximise the sum of everyone’s welfare? We call the resulting labour market position the “Ben-
thamite” position, since it is the political equivalent of Bentham’s goal to achieve “the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number.” 
In our analysis, Benthamite social welfare is a weighted average of the welfare of the em-
ployed and unemployed people. Thus the Benthamite indifference curve, ICs, is a weighted av-
erage of the employed and unemployed people’s indifference curves. It is upward sloping, since 
its slope lies between that of the employment and unemployed people’s indifference curves. 
The Benthamite position is pictured by point B in the following figure: 
 
 
11 For visual ease, the iso-unemployment curve as well as the indifference curves are depicted as straight lines in the fig-
ure, although they are actually curved in the model underlying the exercise. ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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Let us now shift our attention from the best politically achievable position to what may be 
politically feasible within the democratic political process. An influential model of this process 
is the median voter theory, which indicates that if political decisions are taken by majority rule, the 
outcome will be in accord with the preferences of the median voter. Since employed people vir-
tually always outnumber unemployed people by a large margin, the median voter is generally 
employed. Consequently, in the context of our labour market model, the median voter theory 
asserts that the voting process will yield a set of policies that make the employed people as well 
off as possible.  
The figure below shows that the highest indifference curve of the employed people is the 
one that just touches the government budget constraint, so that point M is the outcome of the 
majority voting process. 
 









Observe that point M lies beneath point B (the Benthamite position) along the government 
budget constraint. After all, point M reflects just the employed people’s preferences, whereas 
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the employed people are more in favour of tax reductions and less in favour of unemployment 
benefit increases than the unemployed. Thus the democratic process (via the median voter) 
leads to lower unemployment benefits and taxes than the outcome from a perfectly functioning 
political process (the Benthamite position).12 Usually one would expect employees to prefer less 
labour market reform than the unemployed, but in the case of unemployment benefits, the op-
posite is the case, since a drop in unemployment benefits would permit the employed people to 
enjoy tax cuts. 13 
In practice, however, it is highly unlikely that governments of the advanced, democratic 
market economies would ride roughshod over the interests of a significant minority of the vot-
ing constituency, such as the unemployed. Such behaviour would offend against a principle of 
liberal democracy, namely that the majority is allowed to have its way only if it does not involve 
sacrificing a significant minority. This principle is not only enshrined in a multitude of political 
institutions; it also appears to be commonly supported by a majority of voters in these coun-
tries. The implication, in practical terms, is that sizeable minorities, such as the unemployed, 
may in effect be viewed as blocking coalitions with regard to policies that hurt them. 
Accordingly, in the context of our model, it is reasonable to examine a political process in 
which only those policies are feasible that improve the welfare of both the employed and the un-
employed. As the following figure indicates, the set of policies favoured by the employed peo-
ple are those in the shaded area above their indifference curve ICe and under the government 
budget constraint, while the set of policies favoured by the unemployed people are those in the 
shaded area above their indifference curve ICu and under the government budget constraint.  
The problem is that, for the scenario depicted by the “Anglo-German nightmare,” these two 
shaded areas do not overlap.  14 So there is no set of policies that can be passed by the political 
process. Consequently the labour market is stuck at wherever it happens to be initially. This 
phenomenon may be called “political hysteresis;” it helps explain policy paralysis even in the 
face of high unemployment. 
 
12   In terms of the geometry of the figure above, observe that since the Benthamite indifference curve is a weighted av-
erage of the indifference curves of the employed and unemployed people, and since the employed people have the 
steeper indifference curve, the employed people’s indifference curve must be steeper than the Benthamite indifference 
curve. Consequently point M must lie beneath point B along the government budget co nstraint. 
13 This does not mean, however, that the democratically determined unemployment benefits and taxes also turn out to 
be below their socially optimal levels. Quite on the contrary, the socially optimum point may be expected to lie closer to 
the origin along the budget constraint than both the Benthamite point and the median voter point. After all, the un-
employed want more than the socially desirable level of unemployment benefits, since they do not take full account of 
how these benefits - and the associated taxes - reduce the employed people’s chances of retaining their jobs. Further-
more, the employed may receive excessive wages in the status quo position of the labour market (since employers use 
wages to stimulate job search and work effort and since the employed have market power) and these people do not take 
full account of how these wages discourage employment and thereby reduce the unemployed people’s chances of find-
ing work. Consequently, both the employed and unemployed may have an incentive to vote for higher unemployment 
benefits and higher taxes than is democratically achievable or even socially desirable.  
14 In this scenario, as shown in the figure, the indifference of the employed people (ICe) is steeper than the budget con-
straint at the status quo point I, whereas the indifference curve of the unemployed people (ICu) is flatter.  ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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It is easy to see that all points on the government budget constraint from 0 to point T could 
represent initial positions characterised by political hysteresis.15 However if the economy’s ini-
tial position lies to the right of point T, this deadlock may be overcome. Such a situation might 
arise in the presence of a severe recession, when both the employed and the unemployed may 
want lower unemployment benefits and lower taxes in order to generate more jobs. At point I’ 
in the Laffer portion of the government budget constraint in Figure 14, for instance, the set of 
policies favoured by the employed and unemployed people are those lying above their respec-
tive indifference curves (ICe and ICe, respectively) and under the government budget constraint. 
Observe that now there is some overlap between these two areas. Specifically, the unemployed 
people’s area lies completely within the employed people’s area, so that the policies on which 
both groups could agree now lie in the shaded area, called the “Pareto possibility set” in the fig-
ure.  
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Under these circumstances, the Benthamite policy, at point S, may now lie in the Pareto pos-
sibility set, as illustrated in the figure. Thus it is now politically feasible for the government to 
move from point I’ to the Benthamite point, thereby reducing the unemployment rate from UI’ 
to US. In order to do so, however, it needs to implement unemployment benefit reform and tax 
reform in conjunction with one another with the express purpose of exploiting the existing political 
and economic complementarities. Both policy instruments need to be changed simultaneously to 
move towards the social optimum. Piecemeal, uncoordinated reform – in which one policy re-
form is undertaken at a time – may run the risk of failure, because after the first policy instru-
ment has been adjusted, the economy may arrive at a position of political hysteresis, preventing 
the second policy instrument from being adjusted as well.16 These considerations set the stage 
for an analysis of how political constraints on economic policy may be overcome. 
4. Overcoming political constraints through  
broad-based reform 
Thus far, the upshot of our analysis has been bleak: Even if the status quo of the labour market 
is inefficient (due to high unemployment) and inequitable (in terms of the welfare of employed 
versus unemployed people), it may nevertheless be impossible for the government to implement 
the appropriate policies on account of political constraints. Once political hysteresis sets in, the 
economy may be condemned to perpetuate policies that are not in the interests of society. 
Is there any other way out of this box? Our analysis points to a promising answer: broad-
based reform. This strategy involves abandoning the traditional approach to unemployment pol-
icy making, which involves determining the policy instruments on the basis of political criteria 
and then setting the magnitudes of these instruments in accordance with specific economic goals. 
This dichotomy between political and economic decisions has inadvertently been supported 
through the mainstream economic methodology that takes the set of policy instruments as exo-
genously given and then optimises a policy objective function with respect to these instruments. 
Our analysis suggests that this approach should be replaced by a new strategy: first to identify 
the group of policy instruments whose unemployment effect is characterised by significant eco-
 
16 Such a policy could involve a (suboptimal) horizontal shift from the Laffer portion to the upward-sloping portion of 
the government budget constraint, or it might involve temporarily running a budget surplus.  
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nomic and political complementarities, and then to set these policy instruments conjointly so as 
to exploit these complementarities. 
In short, unemployment policy decisions – concerning both the nature of the policy instru-
ments and the degree to which these instruments are changed – are not to be made in isolation 
from one another. They must be made together, and it is clear why the existence of economic 
and political complementarities calls for such an approach. In the presence of economic com-
plementarities, individual policy initiatives may be ineffective on their own; their true potential 
cannot be assessed unless we explore how their influence can be reinforced through other policy 
initiatives. If the policy measures are implemented in isolation, there is no assurance that such 
reinforcement will be forthcoming. 
Furthermore, isolated policy initiatives are often a recipe for political failure, since each of 
them on their own has a tendency to create winners and losers. If the losers are sufficiently nu-
merous and powerful, they will be able to block these initiatives, even if the winners stand to 
gain a lot more than the losers stand to lose. But if politically complementary policies are for-
mulated conjointly, then the losers from one policy can possibly be compensated by becoming 
the winners of another policy.17  
To see how this works, let us examine how the problem of political hysteresis in the analysis 
above could be resolved by broadening the set of policy instruments so as to exploit further 
economic and political complementarities. Recall that the political hysteresis problem, as de-
picted in Figure 13, involves a simple conflict of interest: The government is unable to achieve 
the socially desirable position by means of tax and benefit reform, since a reduction of unem-
ployment benefits and taxes would hurt the unemployed, whereas a rise in benefits and taxes 
would hurt the employed. Now, however, consider including another instrument in the policy 
package, namely, employment vouchers (or tax breaks) for firms that hire currently unemployed 
people.  
Since such hiring vouchers improve the welfare of the unemployed, they could compensate 
the unemployed for a reduction in unemployment benefits. On the other hand, the vouchers 
may hurt the employees, since firms would gain an incentive to replace some of their employees 
with subsidised new recruits. But in this case the employees could be compensated for this loss 
by a reduction in taxes, made possible through a reduction in unemployment benefits.  
The political possibilities for policy reform that emerge with the expansion of the policy 
package can be illustrated clearly in terms of Pareto possibility sets. Recall that for the baseline 
model above  –  in which only unemployment benefit and tax policies are used, as specified in 
Appendix B.4 and illustrated in Figure 13 –  the Pareto possibility set is empty, so that no pol-
icy change in politically feasible. In the baseline model,18 the replacement ratio (the ratio of un-
employment benefits to the wage) is 0.345 the tax rate is 0.1, and the corresponding hire rate is 
0.232. Now consider what happens to the Pareto possibility set when a hiring voucher (fi-
nanced through reductions in unemployment benefits and taxes) augments the tax and benefit 
policies. Specifically, let the voucher be 0.2, so that the voucher is 17.3% of the wage. This 
broadening of the policy portfolio creates a range of tax-benefit policies that improves the wel-
fare of both the employed and unemployed people and consequently is politically feasible. The 
feasible range of policies is pictured by the Pareto possibility set in Figure 15.  
Figure 15. The Pareto possibility set created by a hiring voucher 
 
[Insert figure here] 
 
 
17 Blinder (1987, p. 209ff) provides useful examples of this strategy in the form ulation of U.S. tax policy. 
18 The other parameters are specified in Appendix B. ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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It is important to emphasise that the political gains from broad reform can be reaped only if 
the reform are undertaken simultaneously and in conjunction with one another. Suppose that, on the 
contrary, a government introduces a hiring voucher without at the same time implementing un-
employment benefit reform and tax reform.  Then the hiring vouchers may reduce unemploy-
ment.  But once this policy has been implemented, the political deadlock about any further un-
employment benefit reform and tax reform may remain.  Only through a simultaneous implemen-
tation of hiring vouchers, unemployment benefit reduction, and tax reductions can political hys-
teresis be overcome and sizeable expansions of the Pareto possibility set be fully realised. 
5. Concluding thoughts 
In sum, our analysis provides  a possible explanation for two widespread policy problems in 
Europe: the disappointingly small unemployment effect of many past reform measures to stimu-
late job creation and job search, and the political difficulties in implementing more extensive 
reform p rograms. We argue that these problems arise neither because the considered reform 
measures are inherently ineffective, nor because of the danger that these measures will neces-
sarily replace European-style unemployment by American-style inequality. Rather, what may lie 
at the heart of the difficulty is the failure of many European governments to consider the im-
plementation of broad-based reform strategies that exploit policy complementarities. 
Complementary policies call for a distinctive approach to policy making. When only a small 
number of unemployment policies – from a broader group of complementary policies – is under 
consideration, it may be politically impossible to implement them and, even if they were im-
plemented, their influence on unemployment would be small. It is only when a broad set of 
policies is all implemented in conjunction with one another that they become politically feasible 
and economically effective.  
If our analysis captures something significant, then the timid approach to policy making may 
simply not be an option. Incremental, small-scale adjustments of existing policy packages may 
be doomed to failure. Perhaps the only way to tackle the European unemployment problem is 
to have the courage to think big and broad. ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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Appendix A: Other Sources of Complementarities 
 
The article has dealt with two prominent economic complementarities, concerning the interac-
tion between the workers’ search for jobs and the employers’ search for workers and between 
employees’ work effort and employers’ retention decisions. In this appendix we consider to fur-
ther complementarities, operating intertemporally. 
There is an intertemporal complementarity operating through search effort. In the current 
time period, unemployment benefit reform stimulates the reward to job search and thereby 
raises current search effort. The increase in current search effort, in turn, raises the chances of 
finding a job in the future and thereby stimulates future search effort. By how much future 
search effort will be stimulated depends on the tax burden. In this way, unemployment benefit 
gives more leverage to the influence of tax reform on search effort. 
This intertemporal complementarity also works the other way round: Tax reform stimulates 
search effort, which increases the chances of finding a job in the future, and the resulting stimu-
lus to future search effort depends on the level of unemployment benefits. So tax reform also 
gives more leverage to unemployment benefit reform. 
 













Besides, there is an intertemporal complementarity operating through work effort.   In 
the current time period, tax reform stimulates the reward to working and thereby raises current 
work effort. The increase in current work effort, in turn, raises the employees’ chances of keep-
ing their jobs in future and thereby stimulates future work effort. By how much future work ef-
fort will be stimulated depends on the level of unemployment benefits (which is the alternative 
to wage income). In this way, tax reform augments the influence of unemployment benefit re-
form on work effort. 
Conversely, a drop in unemployment benefits stimulates work effort, which increases 
the employees’ chances of keeping their jobs in the future, and the resulting stimulus to future 
work effort depends on the tax burden. So unemployment benefit reform also augments the un-
employment effects of tax reform. 
 
Figure A2.  Intertemporal Complementarities Operating through Work Effort 
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Although there are further sources of complementarities in our model, the ones above, 
together with those in the text, are sufficient to illustrate some salient channels whereby unem-
ployment benefit reform and tax reform have complementary effects on unemployment. 
 
Appendix B. The Underlying Model 
Our model is a dynamic efficiency-wage model with labour turnover in the spirit of (Phelps 
1994, Ch. 15), incorporating worker search and optimising decisions of firms. In this model, 
unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits and divide their time between leisure and 
job search, whereas employed workers divide their time between on-the-job leisure (shirking) 
and work. The hiring rates depend on job search intensity (and thus are negatively related to the 
leisure of the unemployed workers) and separation rates depend on the effort decisions of the 
employed workers (and thus are positively related to the leisure of the employed workers). 
Workers make their search-leisure and work-leisure choices so as to maximise their discounted 
lifetime utilities, taking into account the effects of these choices on hiring and firing probabili-
ties.  
Firms know how the employees adjust their effort in response to higher wages and choose 
the wage to maximise profits. The firm pays the same wage to all workers but, in setting the 
wage, it supposes that its choice of wage does not influence the search effort of unemployed 
workers. The underlying assumption is that although the unemployed workers know the equilib-
rium wage offered by all firms, they have no information about any individual wage offer that 
may deviate from this equilibrium wage offer. The firm also chooses the hire rate optimally.  
Our exposition of the underlying model is organised as follows. Section B.1 derives the 
workers’ incentives to search and work. Section B.2 covers the worker’s decisions. Section B.3 
deals with the firm’s decisions. Finally, Section B.4 reviews the particular parameterisation used 
to generate the plots and tables in the paper.  
B.1. Incentives to search and work  
We assume that all workers retire with probability d each period. A worker who is unemployed 
is hired with probability h; otherwise, the worker will either retire or be unemployed next pe-
riod.19 A current employee faces a probability f of becoming unemployed, a probability d of 
leaving the labour force permanently and a probability 1 - f - d of retaining a job.20  
 
19 For expositional simplicity, we omit the time subscripts from all endogenous variables. Thus, for example, the time-
varying variable ft is expressed as f. The exogenous variables of our model (the retirement rate d, the unemployment 
benefit b, the discount factor b, the productivity per worker L, and the coefficients a, f, a, and g) are constants. 
20 One alternative convention for probabilities would be to define them conditional on being alive so that for instance 
the probability a worker who has been employed stays employed is (1  –  f)(1  –  d) instead of 1  –  f  –  d as in our case.   
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Let lu be the leisure of a worker who is unemployed and  h h l u = b g be that worker’s hiring 
probability, where  h lu 'b g < 0  because greater leisure when unemployed implies less search for 
jobs. Furthermore, let  u b l u , b gbe the worker’s current utility and b his unemployment benefit. 
Finally, let V(u) be the present value associated with being unemployed, and V(e) be the value 
of being employed. Then the worker’s problem is to make his leisure decision so as to maximise 
his present value of utility:  
 
V u u b l h l V e h l d V u
l u u u
u b g b g b g bg b g c h b g = + + - - max , , b 1     (B1) 
 
where b is the discount factor.  
The resulting first-order condition is: 
 
u h l V e V u lu u = - ¢ - b b g bg b g .                        (B2) 
 
In other words, the marginal utility of leisure must be set equal to the discounted marginal hir-
ing propensity  - ¢ bh b g times the penalty for not finding a job  V e V u b g b g c h - . Since there is di-
minishing marginal utility of leisure, the optimal level of leisure depends inversely on the pen-
alty for job loss.  
The decision-making problem of an employed worker may be expressed along analogous 
lines. Let le be the leisure of an employed worker and f =f(le) be that worker’s separation prob-
ability, where  f le 'b g > 0 since more leisure when employed implies less effort on the job and 
consequently a greater firing probability. Let w be the wage and t be the tax rate on wage in-
come. Then the employed worker's current utility is  u w t le 1- b g c h , and his decision making prob-
lem is to solve:  
 
V e u w t l f l V u f l d V e
l e e e
e b g b g c h b g b g b g c h b g = - + + - - max , 1 1 b .(B3) 
The associated first-order condition is:  
 
u f l V e V u l e e = ¢ - b b g bg b g .                        (B4) 
 
Here, the marginal utility of leisure must be set equal to the discounted marginal firing propen-
sity  b ¢ f b g times the penalty for job loss (V(e) - V(u)). Once again, diminishing marginal utility 
of leisure implies that the optimal level of leisure depends inversely on the penalty for job loss.  
B.2. The workers’ decisions  
To implement the model, we consider a specific functional form for the workers’ utility, hire, 
and fire functions. We then examine their leisure decisions when unemployed (lu) and employed 
(le). Each worker faces the following hire and fire functions:  
 
h l al u u b g b g = - q 1 .                                (B5) 
 
f l l e e b g=f                                     (B6) 
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where the parameters of the hire and fire functions are either chosen by the firm (as described 
below) or determined by technological relations.  
Equation (B5) relates the leisure of the unemployed worker to his employment probability; 
where the parameter a is exogenously given and the scalar q is determined by the firm (as dis-
cussed below). Both a and q capture how responsive employment probabilities are to decreased 
leisure (increased search).  Equation (B6) relates the leisure of the employed to their separation 
probabilities: the parameter f captures the effect of increased leisure (decreased effort) on fire 
rates.  
For these hiring and firing functions, let us derive the worker’s leisure decision when unem-
ployed  l u b gand employed  l e b g.  Suppose that the unemployed and employed workers have the 




, , b g c h
=
- a a g
g
1
                              (B7) 
 
where c is consumption and  l is leisure. The worker is assumed to consume all his current in-
come, so that c = b for an unemployed worker (where b is the unemployment benefit) and c = 
w(1- t) for an employed worker (where w(1- t) is the take-home pay). We believe this assump-
tion to be a reasonable first approximation for low-wage workers with welfare state benefits 
who have negligible saving and do not have access to capital markets.  
Given the utility function (A7), the hire function (A5), and the fire function (A7), the opti-
mality condition (A2) implies that the  optimum interior choice of leisure when unemployed 
is:21  
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Similarly, the optimality condition (A4) implies that optimum interior choice of leisure when 
employed is:22  
 














1 1 b g b g c h b g
b g b g .          (B9) 
 
These first-order conditions are then substituted back into the optimal value equations and a 
solution for the value function is then derived. This optimal value function is substituted into 
equations (B8) and (B9) to yield the optimal leisure decisions lu and le. Finally, these optimal 
leisure decisions are substituted into equations (B5) and (B6) to determine the equilibrium (op-
timised) hire and fire rates.  
B.3. The firms’ decisions 
The firm maximises profits given by the discrete time Hamiltonian:23  
 














22 The hire rate in Eq. (B9) must lie between 0 and 1  –  d so that  0 1 £ £ - l d e b g f . 
23 Recall that, for expositional purposes, we have suppressed the time subscripts from the endogenous variables of our 
model. Thus we express a variable one period in the future by subscript “+1.” Thus employment at time t as E, and 
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H L T E E = - - + - + + + b q l
t
e F F l w h v h 1 1 1 b g b g ,         (B10) 
 
where E is employment, L is the productivity of a worker, l is the shadow value of an extra 
employee, b is the firm’s discount factor24,  T hF q, b g are worker acquisition costs,25 v is the hir-
ing voucher (a fixed subsidy per person hired), and hF is the firm’s hire rate, which is the number 
of workers the firm hires divided by its workforce. Thus h h U N F = ￿ / b g, where U is aggregate 
unemployment and N is aggregate employment. The Hamiltonian (B10) is maximised with re-
spect to q and w, subject to the equation of motion:  
 
E E + = + - - 1 1 h f d F b g ,                          (B11) 
 
We define: m l b + +
- = 1 1






















F b g     (hiring equation)                (B13) 
 
b m q m
-
+ = - - + - + + - -
1
1 1 1 L T l w h v h h f d e F F F b g b g b g ,    
(value equation)                (B14) 
 
The term of df dw takes into account the effect of changes in the wage on employed work-
ers’ leisure. However, as noted, the firm’s wage decision is assumed not to affect the leisure de-
cision of the job applicants. 
Finally, the stationary state of our labour market system (B11)-(B14) was found numerically. 
B.4. Parameterisation of model  
We let the period of analysis be one quarter. The parameters we have used are: g = 0.75, b = 
0.98, a = 0.94, a = 1.0, d = 0, f = 0.5, L = 1.3, t = 0.1, and b = 0.4. We have parameterised 
worker acquisition costs as T =q
2 2 / . 
We used the NAG routine E04UCF to calculate the numerical solution to our model, given 
the parameters above. 
The parameters above yield a reasonable approximation of labour market flows in Britain 
during the early 1990s. For instance, let us define the long-term unemployed to be those unem-
ployed for at least a year (4 periods). If the transition rate out of unemployment is a constant h, 
then the steady state proportion of people who are unemployed for at least x periods is (1 - h)x. 
Thus, the fraction of the unemployed who are long-term unemployed is (1 - h)4. During the 
early 1990s in Britain, roughly 36% of the unemployed have been jobless for over a year: (1 - 
h)4 = 0.36, This suggests that, under our Markov assumptions, the baseline hire rate should be 
0.2254 which is reasonably close to our computed equilibrium hire rate of 0.232.  
 
24 For simplicity, we assume that workers and firms have the same discount factor. 
25 The worker acquisition costs depend on both q and h to capture the separate effects of training workers hired at rate h 
and the interview costs associated with a given choice of q. ANATOMY OF POLICY COMPLEMENTARITIES, Snower & Orszag 
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The wage in our model is 1.16, which implies a replacement ratio of 0.345, which is close to 
that in the UK. Our separation rate is 0.026, which corresponds to an average job tenure of 
roughly ten years.  
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